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THE SUPREME COLIRT OF THE. STATF OF l/TAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. CASE NO. 15788 
DUNG HUNG VO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant-Appellant was charged in the Third District 
Juvenile Court with violating the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated (1953), Section 78-3a-19, in that being "over the 
age of 18 years" he did "commit the crime of contributing to 
the delinquency of Becky Horton, age 17, a child, under the 
age of 18 years, by willfully, intentionally, and unlawfully 
harboring Becky Horton, age 17 years, knowing that the said 
Becky Horton was a runaway, and by such conduct did tend to 
cause the said Becky Horton to become delinquent." 
- l -
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Ql~POSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Defendant was found guilty after a trial to the Court 
and sentenced to serve ninety (90) days in the Utah County 
Jail and pay a fine of $150.00. 
~fLIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of his conviction or failing 
that, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Testimony presented at the trial indicated that a juve· 
nile, Becky Horton, had run away from home on the 19th day of 
September, 1977. The said juvenile went first to the home of 
Nancy Floyd, a girlfriend, and then to the home of another 
girlfriend, Kathy Fixell. (R.6) I 
Subsequent to the two stops at the girlfriends home, t~I 
defendant went to an apartment where the defendant resided 
with two other Vietnamese males. (R.7) 
Prior to the juvenile leaving home on this occassion, 
she had run away from home four (4) times. (R.25) The defen· 
dant was not present at the apartment when the juvenile arrivf! 
nor did he make an appearance at the apartment for some three: 
- 2-
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to four hours after the juvenile had first come to the apart-
ment, at which time the only contact or conversation between 
the juvenile and the defendant was that the defendant said 
"Hi" to the juvenile. (R.10) The juvenile was at the apart-
ment for three (3) days and two (2) nights during which time 
she only had one conversation of any duration with the defen-
dant which occurred on the second evening that she was at 
the apartment. (R.29) There was never any conversation with 
the defendant in which the defendant told the juvenile that 
she could stay at the apartment, or gave her permission to 
stay at the apartment, or encouraged her to remain at the 
apartment. (R.26) In fact, during the one conversation the 
defendant had with the juvenile, he asked her why she was not 
at home and encouraged her to go home. (R.24,28,29) 
The defendant made no sexual advances toward the juve-
nile during the time that she was at the apartment, did not 
provide food for the juvenile during the time she was there, 
did not restrict her movement or prevent her from leaving at 
any time, and exercised no control or influence over the juve-
nile during the time she was at the apartment. (R.26,30) 
The State introduced a police report over the objection 
of the defendant to establish the age of the defendant as 
being over the age of eighteen (18) years. The objection of 
defense counsel was based upon the corpus delecti rule since 
-3-
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the information was a result of a personal interview with 
the defendant by the police officer. The prosecution 
offered a conversation between the defendant and the juve-
nile in which certain statements were made by the defendant 
during the second night that the juvenile was at the apart-
ment. Defense counsel objected to the admission of any 
statements or admissions made by the defendant upon the 
grounds that the State had not established that a crime had 
been committed independent of ·the statements of the defendant. 
(R.14) The Court al lowed the statements in, subject to strik· 
ing them at a later time. (R. 17) 
The defendant moved at the close of the State's case 
for a dismissal upon the·grounds that the State had failed 
to prove a prima facie case in that there was no evidence 
that the defendant had intentionally or knowingly encouraged 
the juvenile to run away from home, nor was there any evidence 
that he was harboring the juvenile or encouraging her to re-
main away from her home. (R.34) The motion to dismiss was 
denied by the Court. ( R. 35) 
Defendant testified· that he had only met Becky Horton at 
the time that she appeared at the apartment which he rented 
with the two other Vietnamese. (R.36,40) He further testified 
that he had no prior knowledge that the juvenile was coming to 
the apartment or that the juvenile was a runaway until the 
-4-
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second evening that she was there. (R.42,39) The defendant 
indicated that he does have difficulty with the English lang-
uage. (R.47) The defendant also indicated a lack of under-
standing of the term "juvenile" and the law relative to harbor-
ing juveniles. (R.48,49) 
The interpreter was sworn and testified that in his 
opinion the defendant has a very limited ability to speak and 
understand the English language, that the defendant did not 
clearly understand the law and further, that in Viet Nam it 
was not a crime to help juveniles by giving them shelter. 
(R.52,53) 
POitlT I 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE CLOSE 
OF THE STATE'S CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED. 
A. NO ACT OF DELINQUENCY WAS PROVEN BY 
THE STATE. 
The defendant was charged with a violation of Utah Code 
Annotated, ( 1953) Section 78-3a- l 9, in that "the above named 
defendant, over the age of 18 years, in the above-stated County, 
State of Utah, did on or about the 21st day of September, 1977, 
commit the crime of contributing to the delinquency, neglect of 
Becky Horton, age 17, a child under the age of 13 yea rs, by 
Willfully, intentionally and unlawfully harboring Becky Horton, 
age 17 years, knowing that the said Becky Horton was a runaway, 
-5-
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and by such conduct did tend to cause the said Becky Horton 
to become delinquent." 
The act of delinquency alleged to have been committed 
by the juvenile and which defendant is alleged to have caused 
is the running away of the juvenile from home. The provi-
sions of Section 78-3a-16, Utah Code Annotated (1953) as 
amended, does not provide that the runaway child be subject 
to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a result of that 
act. A 1971 amendment to said section, removed the runaway 
from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 
There was no allegation of any violation of any state, 
local, or federal law, nor was there any evidence of any viola-
tion of a state, local or federal law on the part of the juve-
nile introduced by the State. This fact is apparent from the 
Conclusions of Law entered by the Court wherein the Court 
stated: 
"Based 1 -0n the foregoing facts, the Court concludes that 
the female minor child being a runaway was in violation 
of the law of this State and the conduct of the defen-
dant, Dung Hung Vo, was such that it did tend to cause 
this child·to remain a runaway. That this action was 
done knowingly and the Court finds him guilty as charged." 
The evidence presented at trial by the State was simply 
that the juvenile had run away from home, that she stayed for 
three (3) days and two (2) nights at an apartment occupied by 
the defendant and two other .individuals, and that the defendant 
-6-
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knew she was there. 
Assuming that the defendant also knew she was a run-
away and having that knowledge, he allowed her to remain, 
it is apparent that even under those circumstances, he has 
not caused her to be delinquent. 
U.C.A. Section 78-3a-16.5 provid~s: 
"The Court shall have jurisdiction in cases referred to 
the court by the Division of Family Services or those 
public or private agencies which have contracted with 
the Division of Family Services to provide the services 
referred to in Section 55-15b-6 (12) where, despite 
earnest and persistant efforts of the Division of Family 
Services of the contracting agency, the child demonstrates 
that he or she: • 
(l) Is beyond the control of the parents, guardian, 
other lawful custodian, or school authorities 
to the point that his or her behavior or condi-
tion is such as to endanger his or her own 
welfare or the welfare of others. 
(2) Has run away from home." 
In the present case, there was no evidence presented 
which would establish that the juvenile Becky Horton had been 
referred to the court pursuant to the statute cited above. 
Unless so referred after "oersistant and earnest efforts" 
by the Divison of Family Services, the act of running away 
from home is not treated as a delinquent act invoking juris-
diction of the juvenile court. 
There being no act of delinquency proven, defendant-
appellant submits his conviction should be reversed. 
- 7-
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B. THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE 
WHICH, IF BELIEVED, REASONABLE MINDS 
COULD HAVE FOUND DEFENDANT GUILTY, 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
At the conclusion of the State's evidence, the defen-
dant-appellant moved the court for a dismissal upon the 
grounds that the State had failed to orove a prima facie 
case. The trial court denied the motion. 
The complaint charging defendant contains several 
elements each which must be proven by the State before a 
conviction may be had: 
l. A person over the age of 18 years; 
2. contributed to the delinquency.of Becky Horton, 
a child under 18; 
3. willfully, intentionally, and unlawfully harbor-
ing the said Becky Horton; 
4. knowing she was a runaway, and; 
5. caused the said Becky Horton to become delinquent. 
The State must prove the foregoing elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt. In State v. Taylor, 21 U2d 425, 446 P 2d 
g54, this court stated that the prosecution has the burden 
of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt on a charge of contributing to the delinquency of a 
minor. 
Through an admission of defendant as to his age, the 
-8. 
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State proved the first element and also proved the second 
element through the witness Becky Horton. However, as to 
the third, fourth, and fifth elements, the State did not 
present evidence, which if believed, would tend to convince 
a person of reasonable mind of the guilt of the defendant. 
The State failed to present any competent evidence as 
to the authority or control of the defendant over the apart-
ment. 
At page 16 of the transcript of trial, the Court stated: 
"COURT: 
MS. NELSON: 
A: 
That she remained there for 3 days' and 
2 nights--uh--I think we should establish 
something about whose arartment it was and 
things like that I really haven't heard 
that yet. 
Whose apartment was it? 
Uh ... (pause) ... I don't know, I was told 
that Dung was just ... " 
Defense counsels objection was sustained as to what 
the witness was told. During the rest of the State's presen-
tation, and prior to defendant's Motion to Dismiss, there was 
no evidence offered to indicate control of the premises on 
the part of defendant. The evidence only established that 
the defendant slept at the apartment the two nights in ques-
tion along with two unidentified male individuals. Nor was 
there any evidence of any control over the activities or comings 
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and goings of the juvenile by the defendant. (R.27,28,29). 
The Supreme Court of Washington considered a similar 
situation in State v. Davis, 558 P 2d 263 wherein the defen-
dant was charged with contributing to the delinquency of 
minors by furnishing them with alcoholic beverages. The 
State's evidence established the presence of the defendant 
at the house where the juveniles were found. The Court held 
that mere presence in the house without a showing of partici-
pative conduct is not sufficient to support a conviction. 
Considering the testimony of the juvenile in this case, 
to the effect that she had run away four times previously 
(R.25), that she had no prior contact nor arrangements with 
the defendant and in fact went to two other places prior 
to going to the apartment where she was found (R.6,7), and 
considering the defendant actually advised her to return 
home rather than encouraged her to stay (R.29), it is diffi-
cult to imagine a reasonable mind not having a reasonable 
doubt as to the defendant's acts causing the juvenile to 
become delinquent. 
It is respectfully submitted that the State 
failed to prove the elements of the case sufficiently to sur-
vive defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
-10-
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POINT I I 
THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE DEFENDANT 
"HARBORED" A JUVENILE IN VIOLATION OF UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 78-3a-19. 
This Court has previously considered the issues pre-
sented by the appeal in State v. Macri, 28 U 2d 69, 498 P2d 
355, and the defendant-appellant considers that case to be 
dis posit i v e of th i s ma t t er . In Macri , ( supra ) the j u v en i l e 
was not induced nor encouraged to leave home by the defen-
dants. She was simply given shelter. Defendants were charged 
with a violation of U.C.A. 55-10-80(1) which has been redesig-
nated as U.C.A. 78-3a-l9, the statute of which defendant 
appellant in the present case stands convicted. 
The Court in Macri, (supra) held that the mere act of 
providing shelter was not a violation of the statute and 
further, that defendants had no duty to investi9ate the age 
of the juvenile and notify the parents. At 498 P2d 356, 
the Court stated: 
"There is nothing in the record to indicate that during 
Robin's stay at the church she engaged in any unlawful 
or immoral conduct, nor was she exposed to criminal or 
immoral conduct on the part of others. The State con-
tends that the defendants were under a duty to investi-
gate the age and residence of Robin and to notify her 
parents or the authorities of her whereabouts. We do 
not believe that the statute referred to above imposes 
that duty upon the defendants. The simple act of afford-
ing shelter to Robin is not a violation of the statute 
and it is especially true where Robyn was not induced 
nor encouraged to seek shelter at the premises under 
control of the defendants." 
-11-
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The evidence adduced at trial by the State failed to 
establish a prima facie case against defendant in that 
there was no evidence that defendant encouraged the juvenile 
to run away from home, the defendant was not informed at any 
time as to the age of the juvenile, and further, there were 
no unlawful acts or immoral acts engaged in by the juvenile 
during the time she stayed at the apartment. 
In fact, the State's evidence indicated that the defen-
dant was not at the apartment when the juvenile arrived, 
(R. 10), that the juvenile had had no prior contact with the 
defendant (R.8), that the only conversation with the defendant 
the first night she was at the apartment was "Hi" (R. 10), 
that when he did have a conversation with her the second night 
it was then, upon learning she was a runaway, he advised her 
to return to her parents (R. 24,28,29), and that the only con· 
tact the juvenile had with the defendant was the conversation 
on the second night (R.30). Further, there was no indication 
that the defendant knew the juvenile to be under age since 
she never informed him of that fact (R. 29). The defendant did 
not have any sexual contact with the juvenile nor did he harm 
her in any way (R.30). 
Based upon the foregoing, the defendant-appellant urges 
the Court to reverse his conviction as coming within this 
Court's ruling in State v. Macri, (supra). 
- 1 2-
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POINT Ill 
THE TRAIL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT SINCE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE INDEPEN-
DENT OF DEFENDANT'S ADMISSION TO ESTABLISH THE 
CORPUS DELECTI. 
The juvenile, Becky Horton, was allowed to testify 
over the objection of defense, concerning a statement made 
to her by the defendant as follows: 
" ... he was telling me how he took Cindy somewhere else, 
so if I got caught, Cindy wouldn't get caught, or if 
Cindy got caught, I wouldn't get caught." (R.17) 
At the time the statement was introduced, the only 
evidence introduced by the State was that the juvenile had 
gone to an apartment where the defendant was staying without 
any encouragement or contact with the defendant, that she 
had run away from home, and that she had remained at the 
apartment the night previous to the conversation. At that 
point, there was never any evidence that anyone had harbored 
the juvenile. 
Utah case law is clear that there must be independent 
evidence of the crime in order to support a guilty conviction. 
In ~ta~_I_rwin, 101 U 365, 120 P2d, 285, the Court 
found that: 
"In order to support a verdict; the State must prove 
the corpus delecti; that is, that a crime was co1m1it-
ted ... and this without the aid of the admissions of 
of the defendants themselves." 
-13-
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See also State v. Knowfler, 
State v. Cazier, 521 P 2d 554; 
563 P. 2d 175; 
Stat~_Wel 12_, 35 UT 400, 
100 P 681; and State v. Johnson, 95 UT 572 83 P2d. 
Aside from the admission of the defendant, there was 
no evidence that the crime alleged to have been committed 
had actually occurred. Defendant respectfully requests 
reversal of his conviction for that reason. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits that the court should have granted 
defendants Motion to Dismiss for the reasons that no act of 
delinquency was ever proven by the State, and further, the 
State failed to present sufficient evidence to convict the 
appellant. 
In addition, the appellant suggests that State v. Macri 
(supra) deposes of the issues presented by this appeal and 
that the appellant was merely an occupant of an apartment 
who had no part in encouraging or inducing the juvenile to 
run away from home. 
Finally, appellant maintains that there was no indepen-
dent evidence of involvement on his part aside from his 
admissions. 
For the above reasons, appellant maintains his convic-
- l 4-
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tion should be reversed, or failing that, a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
MICHAEL D. ESPLIN 
107 E. 100 South #29 
Provo, UT 84601 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
- l 5-
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Brief, Case Number 15788, along with _____ copies to the Supreme 
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I do hereby acknowledge receipt of the foregoing Appellant's 
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